| 摘要: |
| 无线自组网节点的能量有限导致网内节点往往拒绝承担新节点入网所带来的认证负荷。为激励无线自组网节点参与新节点的入网认证，引入博弈论的公共物品供给博弈理论和维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯（VCG）机制理论，构建了无线自组网的动态接入激励机制。提出了认证节点选举办法，给出了新节点认证付酬和认证节点收益函数，分析了认证能量消耗。理论证明了激励机制具有策略防伪、个体理性和预算平衡3个特性。实例分析了不同参数设置情况下网内节点就新节点接入认证、个体与集体的合作博弈过程，结果表明该机制能有效地激励节点，为了自身的最大利益积极选择参与新节点的入网认证。 |
| 关键词: 无线自组网 接入认证 博弈论 激励机制 |
| DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1001-893x.2017.10.013 |
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| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目（61401499, 61174162） |
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| Game theory based dynamic access incentive mechanism of wireless ad hoc networks |
| WANG Hong,LI Jianhua,CUI Qiong |
| () |
| Abstract: |
| The nodes′ limited energy in wireless ad hoc network makes the nodes in the network not respond a recruit node′s access request vigorously. In order to motivate nodes to participate in the authentication,the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism is combined with the public-goods supplying theory,and the access incentive mechanism for wireless ad hoc network is proposed. Furthermore,how to find the authentication’s node is given and how much income/pay the authentication node gets/needs is presented with the study of energy consumption. It is proved theoretically that the mechanism possesses strategy-proof,individual rational and budget-balanced. Meanwhile,game between individual and collectivity is analyzed according to different parameter configuration in the example of this paper,which verifies that the equilibrium can effectively motivate all nodes′ cooperation,and all nodes should participate in a recruit node′s authentication vigorously for its own profit. |
| Key words: wireless ad hoc network access authentication game theory incentive mechanism |
《电讯技术》编辑部 